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Is Liberalism the Problem?
March 30, 2018

Ross McCullough reviews Patrick Deneen’s Why Liberalism Failed
A specter is haunting conservatism — the specter, indeed, of Marx.
Those conservatives too young to remember the Cold War are
increasingly suspicious of the economic and political prescriptions
of the older anticommunism: capitalism as opposed to socialism;
individual rights as opposed to collectivism. If they are not sure of
Marx’s solutions, they at least share with him a sense of the
problems, especially the meaninglessness and atomization of our
social order. The alternative right is an alternative to precisely this
fading consensus, wagering that race and nation have survived the
ravages of liberal capitalism and can be a home again. But they in
their own way are only the dark creatures of a broad,
Enlightenment liberalism, their whiteness forged in the colonial
encounter rather more than in the premodern past. Religious
conservatives, in turn, have flitted from the supernatural
Patrick J. Deneen, Why
constitutionalism of the older Christian right, in which America is
Liberalism Failed, Yale
University Press, 2018, 248pp,
God’s chosen nation, to an emphasis on natural law, in which our
$30.00
shared sense of right and wrong, of what marriage is and isn’t, can
ground a common politics, to finally an unsettled flirtation with
premodern forms of Christian polity, in which church and state should be distinct but integrally
related in some way. What was solid is melting into air.
atrick Deneen is the doyen of these dissatisfactions, having advanced them well before
Trump, before even the failures of our financial and military adventurism became
obvious a decade ago. His new book has its sights upon those hazy uplands where the
non-liberals of the left, ambivalent about the sexual revolution, and the non-liberals of
the right, ambivalent about ethno-nationalism, converge. That such leftists and rightists barely
exist is more or less Deneen’s point: they indicate a way beyond liberalism, and liberalism has
corrupted or destroyed them. The left it has seduced with sexual liberation and the power of
the state, the right with individualism and the power of the market. Both have acceded to a
false understanding of human freedom, one in which any constraint on individual expression is
seen as infringement. This is a hedgehog of a book, and here lies its singular trick: to trace
changes in politics, economics, technology, and education back to this misbegotten freedom.
The centralized state, the untrammeled market, the technological sciences, the vocational
university all become means by which this freedom is extended, first against the arbitrary
constraints of custom and culture, finally against the constraints of nature itself. Today’s
conservatives may resist the second of these in the name of the first, today’s progressives may
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champion the second in ways that qualify the first, but both are successful only in extending,
not in checking, the loss of constraints, because both accept the erroneous liberty behind it all.
If this seems like a tidy story, the One Big Idea that drives history, that is in part Deneen’s
rhetorical strategy. The book works like rainwater, wearing down by repetition; and this reflects
Deneen’s estimation that our liberalism is both complacent and near its end. It must constantly
be adverted to; it may by enough adversion be washed away. But it also reflects an extension
of Tocqueville’s critique of democracy to the liberalism that lies behind democracy’s modern
form. This concentration of Tocqueville’s critique of a multifaceted political regime to its one
root ideology gives Deneen’s history a Hegelian cast. Combined with his interest in material
conditions and social dislocation, picked up in part from leftists like Alasdair MacIntrye,
Deneen’s analysis betrays its own haunting of Marx. Deneen sometimes plays this specter for
the frisson of critique, as in his suggestion that our new ruling class is just using liberal
ideology to sustain its position. But more often, and here closer to Hegel, he sees the ideas
motivating this class not as mere superstructure but as the fundamental driver of change.
This, roughly, is Deneen’s dynamic of history. First, you have ideas about what human beings
and human society are. The important ideas have a certain unity, connected to some
fundamental principle, and a certain power to extend themselves into everyday life. This
extension is the unfolding of history. But there is also a mismatch between these ideas and,
second, the nature of the human social reality they seek to capture. This nature is at some
level unchangeable, and as the ideas extend themselves, their mismatch with reality becomes
more pronounced.
Third, then, the governing idea proves finally unworkable and the reigning order collapses.
Deneen introduces this sequence with the ideologies of fascism and communism, but the
book’s epigraph, which notes the failure of the middle ages, suggests that the chivalric
Christian ideals of our preliberal past produced a similar dissonance. And most of the book is
Deneen’s argument that the ideology of liberalism is at, or very near, this crisis point.
Because ideologies are the fruit of theoretical reflection that imposes itself in a top-down way
upon practice rather than reflection that emerges from the bottom-up out of practices, the
match between ideology and reality is never particularly good. So, fourth, the solution is to
return to practices without a universal theory – especially local, historically rooted,
environmentally attuned practices – and allow whatever order is to govern the postliberal world
to emerge in a non-ideological way from there.
*

he substance of Deneen’s book, and its strength, is its provocation that liberalism makes
us less free: that it creates a state and a market and an idea of individuality that
together destroy those civil and social and familial associations in which our freedom
can flourish. Those whose optimism about the existing order has survived our recent
adventurism, and is surviving our current adventures, stand to gain the most by the book. If
optimists should in general read pessimists, optimists on this point should read Deneen.
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Still, Deneen’s larger picture is rather overdrawn. Consider the second point of his dynamic.
Deneen notes that liberalism creates in history the atomized subject that it first posits in theory.
It changes us, especially through its technologies: the political technology of the American
Constitution, the architectural technologies of the patio and the suburb, the digital and possibly
transhumanist technologies of today. Deneen’s faith is that “for all this, nature is never spent /
There lives the dearest freshness deep down things” – these technologies cannot destroy us
finally; our sociality will ultimately rebel against them. But it is not clear why we should share
the faith. For Hopkins, whose lines these are, it is “because the Holy Ghost over the bent /
World broods with warm breast.” And perhaps the same is true for Deneen, a conservative
Catholic. But absent some Providence, absent even Providence secularized as dialectic, the
race between the transformative powers of technology and the dilatory rejoinders of human
nature is not assured. Perhaps transhumanism and virtual reality and opioids and who knows
what else together conspire to produce a stable, centralized, inegalitarian liberal cosmopolis: a
finger wagged in your face at some freshly discovered barbarism – forever.
More broadly, it is not clear that liberalism has the sort of unity that Deneen ascribes to it.
Deneen uses the term expressive individualism, but he ignores Charles Taylor’s famous
diagnosis of the thing. Where Deneen sees expressive individualism as grounded in a
voluntarist understanding of freedom, Taylor connects it to Romantic notions of authenticity: the
expressive individual is not free to do whatever she wants; she is free only and finally to be
herself. At bottom there is not a liberty unmoored from moral considerations but a moral
demand unmoored from social expectations. We cannot express just anything; we must
express who we are. And who we are is not just brought about by our expressions but is
something that our expressions must correspond to; it is finally a deep and holy thing. If, say,
transgender activism in the academy tends to follow Deneen’s logic, its popular expression is
much closer to Taylor’s. The choice for Bruce to become Caitlyn Jenner was not sheer
voluntarism but was felt as an obligation. It was not Hopkins but someone more immediately
influential who said, “I’m beautiful in my way / ’Cause God makes no mistakes / I’m on the right
track, baby, I was born this way.”
The point is not that Taylor is right and Deneen is wrong; the point is that both of these lines
are influential; both of them have a claim to characterizing the liberal age. The contemporary
university is aimed not just at “endless possibilities of self-creation” but also at the difficult task
of self-discovery, of who I am and what I am meant to do with my life in a world where these

things cannot be read off my social location but are essentially, almost mystically, individual.
Science is aimed not just at the domination of nature, nor the scientific disciplines just at
vocational training. The greatest prestige is still reserved for the disciplines of unadulterated
wonder: physics is the queen of the sciences, and the more abstruse and astronomical, the
more regal; pure mathematics still looks down on applied (by implication: impure) mathematics.
Kant says in the Second Critique: “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing
admiration and awe, the more often and steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens
above me and the moral law within me.” Though the ethics of our interiority is no longer quite
Kantian, it still draws liberal admiration; and there remains a strong untutored sense of the
vastness of both the universe and the self that commands our devotion.
eneen sees the liberal left, which he associates with the progressive movement, as
fixed upon remaking nature to serve our wills. But this is to ignore the fundamental
ambiguity of nature that this Romantic line of liberalism has tapped into. The
normativity of nature is distorted in all sorts of ways, whether because of some
aboriginal fall or because of the lack of fit between the evolutionary demands of sapient hunter
gatherers and the moral demands of a global society. The refashioning of nature is as often a
humane as a post-humane program. And where it is humane and where post-humane requires
a judgment about what counts as natural, a judgment that is not self-evident. If Deneen thinks
that all his opponents are finally the opponents also of nature, this is only because of his
particular construal of the natural, and his particular conceit that they share it. In that sense,
Deneen has not entirely escaped the tendency to appeal to a self-evident nature, a tendency
that emerges as its own kind of liberal response to the pluralism of early modernity: a shared
understanding of nature can ground politics when persistent disagreement has rendered the
supernatural foundation unstable.
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Spot-the-liberalism is a tiresome game on the left, and there is no point in playing it upon the
right – not least because all parties, including Deneen, agree that some elements of the liberal
order should be preserved in whatever succeeds it. The question is whether Deneen wants this
element going forward, preserving an appeal to nature’s self-evidence in the absence of
revelation. This has its obvious benefits in a pluralistic age; but it has the defect of doing less
work than its advocates hope. Deneen’s Catholic antecedents were less optimistic: they held
that nature was not self-evident without the scriptures, nor the scriptures without the Church;
that Protestants could pretend to a foundation in the Bible and liberals a foundation in the
natural only because of the unanimity secured by the long heritage of Catholic Christianity,
even among its heretics. But their conclusion was that the political realm too needed to
acknowledge the Church in order to function properly. And would Deneen follow them there?

he appeal to revelation is clearly not liberal; the appeal to nature, like the appeals to
voluntarism and authenticity, is ambiguously so. And the point to fix and rivet is that
liberalism is riven by such ambiguities. Deneen reads identity politics as finally about
individual liberation, but it is at least as much about group-belonging or solidarity in the
face of the liberal order. (Deneen asks why “cohesive ethnic groups” like the Kurds don’t get
recognition on campuses, as if there were enough Kurds at Deneen’s Notre Dame to keep a
group going; and as if African-Americans, either the first or second group one thinks of with
identity politics, were not a cohesive ethnic group.) Sometimes these identities can be chosen,
sometimes not: Bruce Jenner could become a woman, but Rachel Dolezal couldn’t become
black. Sometimes their politics is expressed individualistically, sometimes not: “it’s my body”
and “defend women’s bodies” share a conclusion but are not quite the same argument.
Sometimes progressives use the state to secure individual liberty, sometimes to redress class
injustice. To read these more social and less voluntarist sides of liberalism as stemming from
the same misdefined liberty and not as the cry of the soul in the soulless world is only to make
enemies out of would-be friends.
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If this is a question about the first point of Deneen’s historical dynamic, on the unity of the idea
of liberalism, it raises worries also for the third. For if liberalism can be disaggregated in the
way I have begun to do, then why think we face a total collapse rather than constantly shifting
emphases and mutations? Even more, if Deneen is right that liberalism is failing to realize its
own ideals, then liberalism itself provides the resources for its reform. One need only persuade
some share of liberals that freedom and equality and human dignity are better served by, for
example, relying on the state less and on civil society more. This requires that the centralized
American state run out of the political capital it gained in the struggle for civil rights, just as the
centralized European authorities are running out of the political capital gained by continental
peace. But if Deneen is right, if the progressive movement has in fact used the state in a way
that undermines its own ideals, this capital should soon be drawn down. And then why not
think progressives could be persuaded to turn to mediating institutions to guarantee those
same ideals? Why not think that we could further qualify those ideals with the other goods that
Deneen excludes from the essence of liberalism but that are ambient nonetheless – like
authenticity, or belonging?
Deneen is pessimistic here because he has too much faith in the cunning of history: the
strange force of his liberalism, its preternatural cohesion, would overtake any such
development. But the contingencies of liberalism’s emergence should make us careful about
asserting what is not possible. History has less cunning than whimsy, its odd path
dependencies reversed sometimes with a start. This sort of thing may not work, but it also may:
the resources for reversal are there all around us, and we have very little idea of how things go
from here.
*

ll of this suggests that Deneen’s preference for the bottom-up over the top-down is
premature. It is premature from the perspective of his conservative Catholic confreres
because the world, both top and bottom, is fallen, and the only Idea that is not a
distorting ideology is the one passed on in the Church. This idea may diffuse like
Benedict through the Dark Ages, but it may also convert Constantine. Indeed, the aversion to
top-down proposals is itself, on this view, a kind of liberal intuition, as if what comes from
above is always in some way erroneous and always in some way an imposition.
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The proposal is premature for the non-Hegelian because there are post-liberal resources that
have already emerged from the bottom to the top and found expression in, for instance,
elements of progressivism. Why can’t the top begin to theorize and act on what has emerged
from local practice, given that not everything is liberalism? Why can’t it begin to cobble together
the postliberal, given that whatever emerges will not itself be a unified master theory?
And the proposal is premature from Deneen’s own vantage point because Deneen gives us
little reason to think that the liberal top will leave the postliberal bottom alone. Even if the
economic order made it possible for us to form alternative communities, the truly alternative
community will look to liberalism like an encroachment on individual rights – and the immediate
cry will be écrasez l’infâme.
Because the forces of liberalism are so unified, on Deneen’s view, they must be opposed all at
once; and because the reordering is so total, it can only be local. Its cohesion means it must be
uprooted radically and at one go; its failure to penetrate our shelters means we might find
opportunities for uprooting here and there, and for planting anew. We cannot hope to reform it,
because it is irreformable; but we can hope to escape it, because it has not always found us
where we live.
But if we think the reverse, that our liberalism is marked more by its extensive than by its
intensive features; if we think it has disposed the subject in a way that makes local revolution
as impracticable as national revolution, but that its varieties and inconsistencies offer at every
scale the possibilities of reform; if we distrust, as Deneen in other capacities seems to do, the
all-or-nothing instinct of the revolutionary, then we should look elsewhere for new life. It is only
by overreading his own diagnosis and underselling the contingency of his narrative that
Deneen arrives at the sort of view that underpins his recommendations; but he might be right
about the ligatures of the liberal body while underestimating their fragility. And if they are
fragile, the body might be re-fashioned through many small changes over time, without one
part immediately coming to the aid of another.
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ere Deneen might draw a helpful retort from the identitarians, indeed from Marx. For
Marx had his own sort of politics from the bottom. His answer to the question of where
to look for help when the subject is everywhere malformed was to turn to those
oppressed by capitalism, those who have the eyes still to see its faults. And it is
significant that these conservative Catholic complaints have emerged in a period when
conservative Catholics increasingly feel themselves oppressed by liberalism. But Deneen’s
localism makes no mention of the opportunities of the oppressed; his response is held out to
anyone with the acuity to see through the dread Idea. He would be better served by a turn to
the bottom in just this sense, not as local but as trodden down, of models that look not just like
Norcia but like Jackson. This is especially true if he conceives of liberalism’s effects as not only
western but global: of, say, Africa too as not just awaiting its own liberal moment but as having
been at the barrel end of the thing from the colonial period on. There is something absurd,
almost an aesthetic offense, in thinking America’s postliberal future depends on middle-class
experiments in alternative living; there is something appropriate, some deep levity of history, in
thinking it depends on missions from Nigeria.
If Deneen overnarrates his truth, still he has a real truth. If he takes too much of the
Hegelianism of Marx and too little of the material concerns, still he has material concerns. His
fusion of leftists from Polanyi to Lasch to MacIntyre with conservative mainstays like Burke and,
on a certain reading, Tocqueville is a promising one.
The great challenge for that promise, the challenge to the ultimate homogenization of classes
that is the model in Marx and to the local homogeneities that form the model of the
communitarians, is how to do politics across difference. Can there be a common good in the
face of uncommon disagreement? The pluralization of society generated much of the impetus
for liberalism in the first place, and failing to account for continued pluralization will only
frustrate the sputtering impetus toward postliberalism. Deneen punts the question to a future
constituted by diverse communal practices, but the question is in part how to make diverse
communities possible, how to create the conditions under which his future might be born.
Rome has not collapsed; there is no pagan countryside awaiting the order of the abbeys; we
have to bend the imperium to allow the abbeys their order. And if our advice to the imperium is
not to be mere opportunism, if it is to be true, then it should in some measure reflect the way
pluralism is handled in a healthy society.
I do not mean here just the pluralism of, say, the Hapsburgs, where the empire has its true
faith – a diversity rather less of the governors than of the governed. I mean the pluralism of
someone like Abraham Kuyper, where power is devolved to more homogenous communities
but also shared at the highest and heterogenous levels. Can a pluralistic society agree on
something like liberal protections based on a recognition that power is going to alternate
between parties? Can liberals themselves be brought to agree to this, first by recognizing their
view as one substantive position among others and then by renouncing a theory of history that

projects their imminent triumph? Will this Dutch diversity issue ultimately only in indifferentism?
Or is the best that any group can hope for a kind of strong Augustinianism: when in power,
persecute your opponents in love, since their errors make them a danger to self and others;
and when out of power, suffer persecution in joy, since you are winning the crown of
martyrdom?
If there is a chief disappointment in Deneen’s book, it is that he takes these questions to be
unprofitable under the current dispensation and so does not assay an answer. But he
advances enough of an anthropology to adumbrate the beginnings: that we maintain the ideals
of liberalism while sneaking back in some of their older definitions; that we extend the
emancipatory logic of our campus debates to the material and cultural conditions that make a
free and common life possible; that we turn the state toward a reinvigoration of civil society,
including at the cost of individual rights; that we reinforce those lines of the sexual revolution
that are worried by its atomization; that we defend the useless sciences; and on and on in an
almost ad hoc way.
These recommendations proceed in part from Deneen’s own anthropology and so are not
completely ad hoc; they have about as much unity as the liberalism they would replace.
Neither constitutes some one theory of politics. But that is part of the attraction for a pluralistic
postliberalism: there is no one theory of politics; each party will have its own reasons for
supporting the various elements of whatever order emerges. To recommend such an order to a
diverse audience, as Deneen does, is to appeal to a shared set of dissatisfactions with
liberalism, dissatisfactions that may at bottom be rooted in a common nature but that are
understood very differently by different communities. The genius of this book is that, almost
against its own intentions, it provides liberals themselves a reason to adopt its dissatisfactions.
Deneen’s own answer to the title of his book is that liberalism failed because it succeeded; in
succeeding, it undermined its own ideals. But this gives far-sighted liberals cause to revisit their
very success. In the end, Deneen’s lesson is that liberalism can finally succeed only if
liberalism fails.
Ross McCullough is a PhD candidate in Religious Studies at Yale University and a doctoral
fellow at the Yale Center for Faith and Culture.
Save

